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# CO<sub>2</sub> emission abatement in the power sector: on EU ETS and renewables

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- Europe's climate policy on GHG emissions
- $\Box$  CO<sub>2</sub> abatement in the power sector
- Interaction between EU ETS and renewables
- Concluding remarks

# Outline

- Europe's climate policy on GHG emissions
  - EUA price evolution
  - Current problems and how to fix them
- $\Box$  CO<sub>2</sub> abatement in the power sector
- Interaction between EU ETS and renewables
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# Europe's climate policy on GHG emissions EUA price evolution

### 35 30 25 EUA price [euro/tonCO<sub>2</sub>] 20 15 10 5 0 Jan 2009 Jan 2010 Jan 2011 Jan 2012

#### Second phase: 2008-2012

# Europe's climate policy on GHG emissions EUA price evolution



### Europe's climate policy on GHG emissions

Current problems and how to fix them

- Low prices
  - Economic recession 0
  - Inflow of international credits 0
  - Separate policies (e.g., renewables targets) 0

Figure 2: Historic and likely future profile up to 2020 of supply and demand

- Self-reinforcing effect
  - Banking 0
  - Surplus of allowances 0



## Europe's climate policy on GHG emissions

Current problems and how to fix them

### Reform options

- Increase demand for allowances
  - Extend scope of ETS to other sectors
- Decrease supply for allowances
  - Increase EU target to 30% in 2020
  - o Retire number of allowances
  - Revise linear reduction factor
  - Limit access to international credits
- Discretionary price management
- Discretionary quantity management

### Reform plans

### 1. Backloading:

temporary withdrawal of number of allowances in the short term (phase 3)

### 2. Market stability reserve:

quantity management to stabilizeETS price in the long term (phase4)

# Outline

### Europe's climate policy on GHG emissions

- $\Box$  CO<sub>2</sub> abatement in the power sector
  - CO<sub>2</sub> emission drivers
  - Fuel switching as major abatement technology
- Interaction between EU ETS and renewables
- Concluding remarks

# CO<sub>2</sub> abatement in the power sector

CO<sub>2</sub> emission drivers



- Fuel mix, age, technical parameters, etc.
- Might change in the long term (years)

#### **Residual load**

- Electricity demand minus renewables generation
- Might change in the medium term (months)

#### **Generation costs**

- Marginal generation costs of conventional units
- Might change in the short term (days)



# CO<sub>2</sub> abatement in the power sector

CO<sub>2</sub> emission drivers

	Conventional portfolio	Residual load	Generation costs
General influences/policies	Cost, legislation, etc.	Economic growth/ downturn, energy efficiency, electrification, RES obligation, etc.	Fuel prices.
CO <sub>2</sub> cost	Changes levelized cost of electricity, making low- carbon technology more interesting	Electricity price increase, reducing demand, renewables investments	Marginal costs and ranking in merit order

### CO<sub>2</sub> abatement in the power sector

Fuel switching as major abatement technology



 $CO_2$  price where  $MC_{coal} = MC_{gas}$ is **switch price** 

Pure operational, short term

# Outline

- Europe's climate policy on GHG emissions
- $\Box$  CO<sub>2</sub> abatement in the power sector
  - I Interaction between EU ETS and renewables
    - Framework
    - Quantification of interaction effect
- Concluding remarks

### Framework





### Framework



Given the historical amount of renewable injections, what is the effect on ...

- the EUA price?
- CO<sub>2</sub> emission displacement within the EU ETS?

Quantification of interaction effect

#### **ETS-price** assumption

- All equivalent abatement possible in other ETS sectors at current CO<sub>2</sub> price
- Power sector experiences EU ETS as CO<sub>2</sub> tax
- Renewables cause only CO<sub>2</sub> displacement away from power sector (outer limit)



#### **ETS-cap** assumption

- No change abatement possible in other ETS sectors at "any" CO<sub>2</sub> price
- Power sector experiences EU ETS as sectorial cap
- Renewables cause only CO<sub>2</sub> price decline (outer limit)



Quantification of interaction effect

- Approach
  - Simulate the impact of renewables deployment according to the 2 extremes
  - Determine all possible situations between these 2 extremes
  - The 'real' solution lies somewhere on this curve
- Limitations of the analysis
  - Conventional generation system is assumed to be fixed
  - Historical emissions assumed as cap
    - Less banking in absence of RES?
  - No low-carbon investments triggered by a high CO<sub>2</sub> price
  - All wind, sun and bio assumed to be the result of support schemes

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Quantification of interaction effect

- CO<sub>2</sub> displacement according to ETS-price assumption
  - From the power sector to other ETS sectors
  - Respectively 10%, 13%, 16% and 15% of historical emissions





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Quantification of interaction effect

- CO<sub>2</sub> price increase according to <u>ETS-cap assumption</u>
  - CO<sub>2</sub> price needed to keep emissions constant without renewables
  - In 2009, impossible to reach historical emissions

CO <sub>2</sub> price [EUR/tCO <sub>2</sub> ]	OBS	NORES
2007	1	15
2008	22	68
2009	13	00
2010	14	474



Quantification of interaction effect

#### Impact curve



Range of possible effects of historical renewable generation in terms of  $CO_2$  price reduction and  $CO_2$  displacement from the power sector towards other ETS sectors.



- All wind, sun and bio assumed to be the result of support schemes
- No investments in generation capacity
- Historical emissions assumed as cap



Quantification of interaction effect

The intersection of the impact curve with the MACC of the other ETS sectors



# **Concluding remarks**

- General conclusions
  - EU model
    - The CO<sub>2</sub> price decrease caused by renewables deployment turns out to be likely significant
    - CO<sub>2</sub> emission displacement from the power sector to other ETS sectors due to renewables deployment can be up to more than 10 % of historical emissions in the power sector

# **Concluding remarks**

- Reflections on 2030 framework
  - EU ETS
    - If prime instrument for climate action, make way for stable high enough price
    - Backloading
      - · Good first step, but impact limited
      - Current ETS price far too low to trigger coal-to-gas fuel switching (order of 40 €/ton)
    - Market Stability Reserve
      - Impact remains to be seen & further studied

# **Concluding remarks**

- Reflections on 2030 framework
  - RES targets?  $\rightarrow$  Be aware of interaction effects
    - To be further studied
    - RES do not decrease CO<sub>2</sub> emissions but decrease ETS price
    - If RES targets to be continued → market compatible support mechanisms
    - Higher costs

# More information?

See website research group in Leuven (Belgium):

http://www.mech.kuleuven.be/en/tme/research/energy\_env ironment/Energy\_and\_environment

• Including publications

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